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CDR Foxhall A Parker, Potomac Flotilla, writes SECNAV "I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 9th instant, in relation to the plan of the rebels to blow up the Roanoke, and report that I have for some time past had two vessels cruising off the mouth of the Wicomico and two off the mouth of the Coan and Yeocomico rivers, the direction from which I should expect the attack."

LCDR William N Jeffers, Inspector of Ordnance, writes CDR H A Wise, Bureau of Ordnance, "I herewith forward a description of the explosion vessel Louisiana, with all the arrangements made by Major Rodman and myself, in accordance with the directions of the Bureau, and opinion of the ordnance and other officers who were consulted with regard to the probable effects of the explosion on Fort Fisher, and the means of causing it to take effect." The enclosure reads
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RADM Jonathan Dahlgren, South Atlantic Blockading Squadron, writes SECNAV "I regret to inform the Department of the destruction of the U. S. monitor Patapsco by a torpedo last night about 8 o'clock near the entrance to the lower harbor of Charleston.
    At the time of the occurrence this vessel was the picket monitor of the nlght, and was underway engaged in covering the scout and picket boats that were searching the channel for obstructions and torpedoes.
    A court of enquiry has been ordered, to ascertain all the circumstances connected with this disaster, and the result will be laid before the Department when arrived at.
    Meanwhile, for the present satisfaction of the Department, I will narrate some of the events that immediately preceded or were connected with the loss of the Patapsco, and such of the incidents attending it as have come to my knowledge or were under my observation.
    I parted from General Sherman at Savannah on the afternoon of Friday, the 13th, with an understanding as to the movements he was to make, and a request that General Foster and myself should make as much impression on Charleston as our force permitted, but the general did not desire that they should go so far as to commit my vessels to a decisive attack on the batteries.
    As the period when this was likely to occur left me very little time for preparation, I hastened to Charleston, stopping at Port Royal only the afternoon of Saturday for the purpose of leaving directions for the steamers that might assist in the movements of General Sherman while near the waters in the vicinity.
    It was about 8 o'clock on the morning of the 15th when I reached Charleston, and immediately called on board Captain Scott, the senior officer, and the commanders of the monitors, in order to apprise them of what was likely to occur and of the necessity for, hastening such preparations as might be necessary, or the time allowed.
    The morning passed in conversing on the subject, and a free expression of opinion was entered into and given by Captain Scott and all the captains of the monitors, Captains Quackenbush, Semmes, Lewis, Barrett, Stone, Mayo, and Fillebrown. Fleet Captain Bradford was also present.
    I drew to their attention the different modes of operating with the ironclads, from a mere demonstration upon Sullivans Island to the decisive measure of forcing their way to the city.
    This, however, was left to be decided by the arrival of the ironclads from the North Atlantic Squadron, which might be expected, and by the strength of the cooperating force under General Foster, and by the circumstances that might arise in the course of events.
    I desired, as a preliminary measure, that the channel at the entrance of the harbor should be thoroughly examined; and to make this more sure required the commanders of the advanced monitors to give their personal attention to the duty, which hitherto had been intrusted to the scout boats.
    There were representations from various quarters that obstructions had been laid across the channel from Sumter, and it was important to know if this were true, and, if so, their nature and extent, with directions for their removal by explosion.
    Captain Scott was directed to furnish all the facilities in his power for the service. Steam tugs, boats, men, grapnels, hawsers, etc., and other orders were given, so as to prepare as well as possible all the means at disposal for the cooperation with General Sherman.
    After a long and full interview with the naval commanders, as above mentioned, I went ashore, accompanied by Lieutenant-Commander Matthews, and, with General Schimmelfennig, visited the works at the extreme of Morris Island, in order to possess myself of a full view of the channel and rebel works from that direction and to note any important changes.
    All was quiet and undisturbed. Within near range was Sumter, and a little farther the heavy batteries of Johnson and Sullivan's Island, and in the distance the dwellings and spires of the city, but not a vessel or living thing was to be seen on the waters of the harbor nor about the batteries. Outside lay the Union fleet quietly at anchor.
    Returning late, the evening passed away in business of the squadron, and then, much fatigued with continued exertion night and day for several days, I fell asleep, from which I was aroused about 11 o'clock by the entrance of Captain Quackenbush and his first lieutenant, who announced the loss of the Patapsco.
    The advanced duty of the night had devolved on the Patapsco and Lehigh. The latter was at anchor in the advance at the reserve station. The Patapsco got underway and proceed!d up the harbor about dark for duty as picket monitor of the night, and passed on to the usual station some 500 yards farther than the Lehigh. Here she rounded to, head downstream and to the flood tide.
    From this point Captain Quackenbush suffered the Patapsco to drift with the tide, as the best mode of controlling the vessel and covering the operations of the boats.
    Three scout boats, with grapnel drags, were now slowly pushed on, while two tugs steamed about the bows of the Patapsco and six or seven picket boats were pulling on her quarters or beam.
    In due time the Patapsco found herself so far up as to be nearly on a line drawn from Sumter to Moultrie, when she steamed down to the vicinity of a buoy, known as the Lehigh, because it marked a projecting shoal where the Lehigh had grounded about a year ago.
    Here the engines were stopped, and the Patapsco again drifted up. When near the former position she steamed back, approached the Lehigh buoy, stopped engine, and again drifted up. When near Sumter Captain Quackenbush steamed down once more, and for the last time. While approaching the Lehigh buoy, there was a shock, a sound of explosion, a cloud of smoke on the port side, and in less than half a minute the Patapsco's deck was under the surface.
    Captain Quackenbush and his first lieutenant were standing on the top of the turret looking to the course of the vessel, for she had grounded once already on the shoal near the Lehigh buoy when standing down the first time. They saw and heard only what is stated above.
    The captain gave the order to start the pumps and lower the boats, but scarcely a whole minute was allowed for the least effort.
    Five officers and 38 men were saved; 62 officers and men are miss- ing. The survivors were those who happened to be on deck, and 2 men from the windlass room, 3 from the berth deck, 1 from the turret chamber, and nearly all those who were in the fire room. Their names are annexed.
    From such accounts as I can gather in so short a time as has elapsed, it would seem that the explosion occurred on the port side under the wardroom, blowing it up, so as to drive up the table and three officers who were sitting about it. The spar deck was not blown through, but the lookout on the port side, and some 10 feet from the edge of the deck, was thrown up suddenly and fell back with such force as to be nearly senseless. His rifle exploded and he was aware that the ball passed near him.
    A man in the windlass room saw a flash and heard a sound like that of a shell near him. The lamp was extinguished; he heard the water coming in, and escaped up the hatch on deck.
    It appears also that there was no disrupture of the vessel at the berth deck nor farther aft; that no water came in there save at the hatches, as the Patapseo settled in the sea, and that her bow went down first, throwing the stern high up for an instant, so that a man standing there had to grasp at something to keep upright.
    It is believed that the berth-deck ladder was dislodged by the shock and in the panic could not be replaced, hence no men there were saved except those who rushed aft into the fire room.
    The Lehigh had got underway when the Patapsco passed, and followed her movements in drifting and steaming, but did not go so far up and retained her position assigned as a support.
    She anchored near the Lehigh buoy about 7:45, and some twenty or twenty-five mmutes later heard an unusual but not very loud report, saw a cloud of smoke, lost sight of the Patapsco, which previously had been dimly visible through the obscurity of the night, then heard mens voices as if from the water, and fearing something wrong, sent her boats to the Patapsco and weighed anchor. The disaster soon became known.
    The top of the Patapscos smoke pipe is seen above the water, but as yet there has not been leisure to determine the precise position relatively to other objects. It is stated as 600 to 800 yards from Sumter and below it.
    The Patapsco had her torpedo fenders and netting stretched as usual around her. Three boats with drags had preceded her, searching to some depth the water they had passed over, while steam tugs and several boats were in different positions on the bow beam and quarter.
    No one who has not witnessed it can appreciate the harassing nature of the never-ceasing vigilance with which the monitor duty is sustained in this harbor, no matter what the weather may be - amid the heat of summer and the cold of winter, or the heavy gales and bad weather which so often visit this anchorage.
    Most minute instructions have been given and repeated in regard to rebel torpedoes, and nothing more can be done to bar the chance of accident, save permanent torpedo catchers, substantially made and attached to the bows, so as to be entirely submerged and thus not to be exposed to shot in action.
    This can not be done here, and it may be that the fruitful invention of Mr. Ericsson may supply the desideratum.
    Objects on the water, supposed to represent the obstructions, are reported to me to-day as extending across from Sumter.
    Three rebel ironclads are just reported to me as distinctly seen in the Cooper River, while the fourth has a large number of men busy about her, and smoke is said to issue from her pipes as if steam were up. This is stated to appear much larger than the other three.
    Four torpedo boats are said by deserters to be ready for service, and upon them, in the confusion of action, as well as the torpedoes in the water and at the bows of the ironclads, the rebels are said to rely chiefly.
    It may be their intention, if Charleston must fall, to try the chances of battle, as rather more respectable than blowing them up.
    Of the six which I have here, one or two are always under some repair, and the Sangamon, now at Port Royal, can not be ready before the 31st.
    Nothing further has reached me of the actual movements of General Sherman, but he will not remain in present position much longer.
    I would draw to the attention of the Department the fact that there is no need now of vessels to maintain the blockade at Ossabaw. Wassaw, and Savannah River, yet that our positions at Wassaw and Savannah will have to be maintained and the blockade at Ossabaw resumed as soon as our forces move, for our line rests at the left on Thunderbolt, and when the army moves, leaving a garrison to hold Savannah, the rebels may be expected to show themselves on the front.
    More effective vessels must therefore be maintained at those places than heretofore.
    I write hastily, so as to use the opportunity offered by the departure of a steamer of Admiral Porter's fleet.
    Will the Department please to order a few more tugs for Service in this squadron, as well as a few more launches? They are much needed."

CAPT Thornton A Jenkins, 1st Division, West Gulf Blockading Squadron, writes LCDR W W Low, SOPA Upper Fleet, Mobile Bay "You will be pleased to avail yourself of the first flag-of-truce boat that may be sent out by the rebels to inform the person in charge of her that it having been observed that, disregarding the notification that no letters would be received except those for or from prisoners of war and official communications to the commanding officer, many letters of private persons, as well as of those claiming to hold official positions among the rebels, have been found in the bundles marked prisoners letters, which, if repeated, will be followed by a positive order prohibiting the transmission of any letters by flag of truce except those addressed to the commanding naval officers though the lines within the limits of my command.
    The recent attempt to smuggle letters under a flag of truce could not well be too harshly characterized."